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Abstract 
This paper is aimed at analysing the level of postmaterialist values in East European countries as well as the 
main individual and country level predictors of the postmaterialist value preference. The data from the World 
Values Survey (WVS) and the European Values Survey (EVS), conducted on the nationally representative 
samples in the period from 1990 to 2008, were used. The main analysis was performed on the data from the 
fourth wave of EVS (2008/2010), on the total of twenty countries and 30,393 respondents. A number of 
individual (age, education, income level, size of town, economic hardship in formative years) as well as 
country level variables (inflation and unemployment rate, Human Development Index and GINI index values) 
were used. The results have shown that the level of postmaterialist values in Eastern Europe, measured by 
the standard four-item index, is relatively low and relatively stable in the period 1990–2008. Younger, urban 
and more educated respondents as well as the citizens from more developed and economically stable East 
European nations are more inclined towards postmaterialism. The significance of the current socio-economic 
conditions for the variation in postmaterialism as well as the insignificance of economic security during the 
formative period of political maturation calls into question the assumptions of Inglehart’s original model. The 
possible alternative mechanisms of value change as well as of the (post)materialist conception are 
discussed.     
: (post)materialist values, value change, East European countries, European values Survey. Keywords
 
 
1. Introduction 
Since Inglehart’s seminal work (Inglehart, 1971), postmaterialist values, understood as assigning priorities 
to self-expression and quality of life as opposed to physical and economic security, have become a very 
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important heuristic tool in social sciences. In his early work, postmaterialist values were viewed as a main 
manifestation of value change in advanced societies, main component of democratic political culture and a 
sort of a cultural precondition of democracy (Inglehart, 1971; 1990; 1997).1  
In the original model, postmaterialist value change is explained by two hypotheses (Inglehart, 
1990). Scarcity hypothesis claims that individual values reflect socio-economic environment – the largest 
subjective importance is assigned to the most important ungratified needs, in keeping with the principles 
described in Maslow’s theory of human motivation (Maslow, 1954). Material (lower) needs when ungratified 
take primacy over all other needs, but once satisfied they are taken for granted and some other 
(postmaterialist) needs gain more importance. The prosperity (e.g. economic growth in Inglehart’s terms) is 
thus conducive for spreading of postmaterialist values. 
The socio-economic environment has the most prominent role, but its relationship with value 
priorities is not one of immediate adjustment. The early (formative) years of individual development are 
what matters. Socialization hypothesis states that one’s value preferences reflect the (socio-economic) 
conditions from one’s formative years, until early adolescence. People tend to hold the early instilled 
preferences and “the statistical likelihood of basic personality change declines sharply after one reaches 
adulthood” (Inglehart, 1990, p. 69). In short, individual and societal values do not change overnight, but 
gradually and by generational replacement. This would also imply that the faster the economic growth, the 
greater the cohort differences. 
Two hypotheses combined imply that the shift towards postmaterialist values is not to be expected 
within every society. If this were the case, the model would be strongly confounded by and inseparable 
from the life-cycle effects, the inherent tendencies of individuals to accept materialist goals more as they 
grow older. Starting from the 1970s onwards, Inglehart and his associates have confirmed the tendency of 
younger age cohorts to be more inclined towards postmaterialism over and over again, first on a limited 
number of developed Western democracies (Inglehart, 1971) and some other developed societies over the 
globe more recently  (Abramson&Inglehart, 1992; Inglehart, 1997; 2007; Inglehart&Welzel, 2005). 
Postmaterialist value shift is (or, at least, was) restricted to the countries that achieved a long-term 
economic development. 
Based on such sound empirical grounding, back in the last decade of the 20th century, Inglehart 
predicted that the number of postmaterialists will exceed the number of materialists in the ratio 5:3 until 
2010 (Abramson & Inglehart, 1992), despite the gradual effect of generational replacement, the fall in birth 
rate in the late 1980s, economic ebb and flows etc. Inglehart (Inglehart, 2007; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005) 
reported that there was a significant value shift in the period from 1970 to 2000 in the predicted direction in 
several developed West European countries; a similar trend has been found elsewhere (Clarck & Dutt, 
1991). However, not only that this trend towards postmaterialism in some countries was very weak, absent, 
or reversed (a declining percentage of postmaterialists) (Boltken & Jagodzinski, 1985), but, generally, in the 
developed countries of Western Europe, changes take place in the direction of enlargement of the mixed 
type group (Arts & Halman, 2004). 
Plenty of other studies did not confirm Inglehart’s empirical and theoretical assumptions. Despite 
the model predictions, numerous studies failed to confirm significant relationships between the acceptance 
of postmaterialism and some of the model’s crucial variables. Davis and Davenport (1999) report no 
significant correlation between age and postmaterialist value preference and significant negative correlation 
between the income level and acceptance of postmaterialist values – quite contrary to model’s predictions, 
                                                          
1
 In his more recent work, Inglehart has argued of self-expression (Inglehart & Welzel, 2005) or emancipative values (Welzel & 
Inglehart, 2009). However, postmaterialist values figure as one of the most important components in both cases. 
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the more affluent individuals ranked materialist goals higher. Duch and Taylor (1993; 1994) disqualified the 
relevance of economic conditions during one’s maturation period for postmaterialism, proving the very 
important role of one’s education level as well as the influence of some other variables which Inglehart’s 
model does not account for (such as, for instance, population size of settlement). Other scholars found 
strong influence of current economic context (such as inflation and unemployment rate at the time of 
survey) on the postmaterialist preference (Clarck & Dutt, 1991; Clarke et. al., 1997; Clarke et. al., 1999; 
Duch and Taylor 1993; 1994). These pieces of empirical evidence can hardly be explained in terms of 
Inglehart’s model and question both the scarcity and the socialization hypothesis. 
East European countries are a very interesting case for the validation of the postmaterialist values 
shift model as well as a relatively under-researched area in that sense. Available empirical evidence is 
mostly in line with Inglehart’s predictions and shows relatively low preferences for the postmaterialist goals 
in Eastern Europe (Arts & Halman, 2004; Inglehart & Welzel, 2005; Inglehart, 2006; Pavlovic, 2006; 2009) 
but there are some exceptions that show relatively high percentage of postmaterialist in the former Soviet 
Republic countries (Duch and Taylor 1993). Bearing in mind poor economic performance of communist 
regimes, painful and in some cases even traumatic events after the fall of communism in Eastern Europe 
and the transition period that followed, modest economic and political performances of newly established 
democratic governments et al. the shift toward increasing postmaterialist preferences is not to be expected. 
In line with that, some studies have shown small cohort differences in Eastern Europe and greater 
importance of some other factors (such as education, socio-economic conditions at the time of the survey 
etc.) (Duch and Taylor, 1993). Furthermore, even when intergenerational differences are in accordance 
with Inglehart’s assumptions (the younger are more postmaterialist), those differences in some cases can 
hardly be explained in terms of the scarcity and socialization hypothesis. Serbian youth, for example, is 
found to be more inclined toward postmaterialism (Pavlovic, 2009), but it is the population stratum that grew 
up and spent their formative years during the period of extreme economic hardships (during the 1990s). 
Inglehart (Abramson & Inglehart, 1994) argued that relatively high levels of postmaterialism in ex-
communist countries can be explained by the sense of security that communist regimes offered (safe jobs, 
low rents, free education etc.). However, there is a big problem with this kind of argumentation. According 
to the theory, economic growth causes postmaterialism, but if the postmaterialism is high and economic 
growth absent, then some other factors are conducive to economic security. In that way, the presented 
model becomes unfalsifiable. Postmaterialism would in that case be double or multiple caused – by the 
sense of security based on country’s economic growth as well as by the sense of security based on some 
other diffuse source(s). Others called for the reconceptualization of the concept of postmaterialism, treating 
it as an indicator of democratic political outlook or values related to political liberalism (De Graaf & Evans, 
1996; Duch and Taylor 1993; Warwick, 1998).       
Presented evidence and available data suggest that some of Inglehart’s basic assumptions are 
debatable as well as that there are some very important individual as well as macro/country level factors 
that are either not accounted for in the theory or contradict it. This study offers some additional evidence on 
the determinants of postmaterialist value preferences in East European countries and has two main aims: 
(1) to determine the level of postmaterialist values in Eastern Europe and more recent changes with this 
respect, and (2) to determine the main individual and country level determinants of postmaterialist values. 
 
  
2. Methodology 
Sample. The data from different waves of the World Values Survey (WVS) and European Values Survey 
(EVS) were used (as described later). The main analysis was performed on the nationally representative 
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samples in twenty East European countries (N=30,393) from the fourth wave of EVS (conducted from 2008 
to 2010). The following countries were included in the analysis: Albania (N=1,534), Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (N=1,512), Bulgaria (N=1,500), Belarus (N=1,500), Croatia (N=1,525), Czech Republic 
(N=1,821), Estonia (N=1,518), Hungary (N=1,513), Latvia (N=1,506), Lithuania (N=1,500), Moldova 
(N=1,551), Montenegro (N=1,516), FYR Macedonia (N=1,500), Poland (N=1,510), Romania (N=1,489), 
Russian Federation (N=1,504), Serbia (N=1,512), Slovak Republic (N=1,509), Slovenia (N=1,366) and 
Ukraine (N=1,507).  
Variables and measures. Based on the theoretical and empirical evidence of their relevance as 
well as the available empirical data, the following individual level variables were used: 
• Age (measured in years); 
• Education (country specific educational level is recoded in three categories: lower, middle, upper); 
• Monthly household income (country specific income values are recoded in twelve-point scale, from less 
than 150 euros to 10,000 euros and more)2; 
• Size of town (eight-point scale, from under 2,000 inhabitants to 500,000 and more) 
• Economic (in)security during maturation. The answers to two four-point scale questions “Parent(s) had 
problems replacing broken things” and “Parent(s) had problems making ends meet” were summed and 
treated as a measure of perceived economic hardships during adolescence/formative years. 
• (Post)materialist values. The standard four-item index (Inglehart, 1971; 1990) was used as a measure 
of (post)materialist values. Respondents were offered four social goals towards which their country 
should strive in the following ten years. Out of four offered goals – fighting rising prices, maintaining 
order (materialist values), giving people more say in important government decisions, protecting 
freedom of speech (postmaterialist values) – the respondents were asked to choose the two which they 
considered most important. The respondents who chose two materialist goals obtained the score of 1 
(materialist values); those who chose both postmaterialist goals obtained the score of 3 (postmaterialist 
values), while the respondents of mixed priorities obtained the score of 2 (mixed type). 
As far as country level variables are concerned, the list includes several socio-economic indices:  
• Human development index. HDI is a composite measure of four aspects of human development: 
life expectancy at birth, mean years of schooling and expected years of schooling, and gross 
national income per capita. It is often treated as an indicator of a country's level of social and 
economic development. 
• Unemployment rate. Refers to the share of the labour force that is without work but available for 
and seeking employment. 
• Inflation rate. Measured by the consumer price index that reflects the annual percentage change in 
the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services that may be fixed or 
changed at specified intervals. 
• GINI index. It is a measure of the extent to which the distribution of income or consumption 
expenditure among individuals or households within an economy deviates from a perfectly equal 
distribution3.  
All of the measures for country level variables are from 2008, which is the period when the fourth wave 
of EVS (used in this study) was conducted. 
 
                                                          
2 Preexisting variables in EVS data set for the recoded educational level and recoded income level were used.   
3 Data for HDI, inflation rate, unemployment rate and GINI index by country are obtained from data.worldbank.org (accessed 
10/09/2014). 
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3. Results 
The results will be presented in two sections. First, the data on the level of postmaterialism in East 
European countries will be presented. The analysis of the determinants of the postmaterialist value 
preference will follow. 
 
3.1 The level of postmaterialism in Eastern Europe 
The level of postmaterialist values in Eastern Europe at the end of the former decade (in 2008) is relatively 
low (6.3% in average, varying from 1.1% to 14.2%). The data are presented in Table 1. The highest 
percentage of postmaterialists was found in Slovenia (14.2%), Czech Republic (10.8%)4 and Macedonia 
(10.4%). Bulgaria (2.1%), Ukraine (2.1%) and Russia (1.1%) are countries with the lowest percentage of 
postmaterialists. 
 
Table 1. Percentage of postmaterialists in East European countries by waves of EVS and WVS 
 
1990/1994 1995/1998 1999/2001 2008/2010 Net change 
Albania  - 0.5 4.1 6.8 +6.3 
Belarus  2.1 5.1 6 6.4 +4.3 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina  - 3.2 4.6 3.5 +0.3 
Bulgaria  9.7 4.2 3.2 2.1 -7.6 
Croatia  - 15 19.1 8.3 -6.7 
Czech Republic  5.8 - 9.7 10.8 +5.0 
Estonia  6.4 4.9 2.5 6.1 -0.3 
Hungary  4.2 2 2.4 7.8 +3.6 
Latvia  9.8 4.5 4.8 6.7 -3.1 
Lithuania  12.6 3.5 6.3 4.1 -8.5 
FYR Macedonia  - 4.4 4.8 10.4 +6 
Moldova  - 2.8 5.6 4.8 +2 
Montenegro  - 6.5 6.4 6.2 -0.3 
Poland  9.7 5.4 7.6 6.9 -2.8 
Romania  7.6 4.6 7.1 4.2 -3.2 
Russia  2.8 1.6 1.7 1.1 -1.7 
Serbia  - 6.1 6.1 5.6 -0.5 
Slovakia  6.2 6.3 4 8.8 +2.6 
Slovenia  7.3 13.9 16 14.2 +6.9 
Ukraine  - 2.5 3.5 2.1 -0.4 
         Note: Data are weighted by country weight variable available in the EVS dataset to adjust socio-structural characteristics in 
the sample (gender and age) to population parameters; “-” implies the missing data; data for 1995-1998 are taken from WVS as 
well as the data for Russia and Belarus for 1990-1994 and Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro and 
Serbia for 1999-2001; all other data are from EVS. Net change was calculated in the following way: (%2008/2010 - %1999/2001) 
+ (%1999/2001 – %1995/1998) + (%1995/1998 - %1990/1994); if the data for some wave were missing, they were excluded 
from the applied formula. 
                                                          
4 Slovenia and the Czech Republic are known to be rare exceptions regarding a relatively high proportion of postmaterialists in 
Eastern Europe, comparable to those found in some developed Western countries (see, for example, Arts & Halman, 2004).  
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It seems that the trend in value change is not best described by the changes in the level of 
postmaterialism. The fact that the percentage of postmaterialists is increasing or decreasing does not 
necessarily imply that the percentage of materialists changes accordingly. The picture is rather complex. 
For example, from the 1999/2001 to the 2008/2010 period, in Bulgaria, Belarus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia there is a common trend of a decreasing number of materialists and a 
growing number of the mixed type, adjoined with a country specific, varying trend in the change of 
postmaterialist goals preference (i.e. increase or decrease). In Croatia, Czech Republic, Russia and 
Slovenia, the reverse trend is visible – the number of materialists is growing, while the mixed type is being 
(slightly) reduced; at the same time, only in the case of Croatia there is a significant change in the 
(decreasing) percentage of postmaterialists between the two periods. Finally, there are countries (for 
example, Poland or Ukraine) in which the proportion of three value types in the beginning and the end of 
the past decade is almost identical, implying the absence of any value change. 
The story of a value change in the recent decade in Eastern Europe seems to be a story of a mixed 
type value profile. If a certain trend in value change in the observed period is present and persistent, it is 
identifiable in the enlargement of the mixed type category, similar to what has been recorded in the 
Western societies (Arts & Halman, 2004). The most recent EVS data (2008/2010) have indicated that out of 
twenty countries shown in Table 1 only in Russia and Moldova materialists outnumber the mixed type 
category (but by a small margin); in every other country, the majority of population (>50%) is characterized 
by the mixed type. There is no country in which the postmaterialist category outnumbered any of the 
remaining two at any point in time. 
 
3.2 The predictors of postmaterialist values preference 
In the analysis of the individual and country level predictors of postmaterialism, hierarchical linear modelling 
was applied with the postmaterialist index as dependent variable. Before entering the analysis, all variables 
were standardized and checked for possible multicollinearity between the country level variables (not 
detected). Standard procedure in this type of analysis was followed (for example, as suggested by Hox, 
1995) and the main results are summarized in Table 2 and Table 3. 
 
Table 2. Estimates of random parameters and explained variance from three models 
  Null model Full individual 
model 
+ Country level 
variables 
Individual level variance 0.325 0.318 0.318 
Between-country variance 0.013 0.011 0.005 
Explained individual level variance  2.1%  
Explained country level variance  15.3% 61.5% 
ICC 0.038   
 
The model with no predictors, the so-called null model, shows that 3.8% of the variation in 
postmaterialist values stems from the variation between countries (ICC=.038) (Table 2). Although 
significant, between-country variation in postmaterialism is rather small. Adding the individual level 
predictors to the model can account for 2.1% of individual level variance and 15.3% of the country level 
variance. The addition of country level variables to the model raises the percentage of the explained 
between-country variance to 61.5%. 
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The estimates of fixed effects (Table 3) showed that, at the individual level, younger, more 
educated and urban population strata are more inclined towards postmaterialism. Age is one of the most 
important variables in Inglehart’s model, directly probing for the relevance and validity of socialization 
hypothesis. Cohort differences are in accordance with the model predictions but it is an open question 
whether they can be explained by the model. Intergenerational differences after the period of economic 
growth fit the proposed model. Still, as stated previously, the young population strata in post-communist 
societies spent their formative years in times of great social/political/economic turbulences5. Even if we 
acknowledge the economic growth after the fall of communism (at least in some parts of Eastern Europe), it 
does not unequivocally imply the economic security per se (which is, essentially, what matters).  
 
Table 3. Estimates of fixed parameters 
Fixed effects Estimate Std. Error df t Sig. 
Intercept 1.688 .016 19.773 103.413 .000 
Individual level 
     
Age -.054 .004 21210.450 -12.700 .000 
Education .038 .004 21208.382 8.785 .000 
Monthly household income .009 .005 20692.661 1.932 .053 
Size of town .019 .004 20932.413 4.723 .000 
Formative economic (in)security -.005 .004 21153.102 -1.306 .191 
Country level 
     
Inflation rate 2008 -.041 .018 19.882 -2.232 .037 
Unemployment rate 2008 .027 .020 19.685 1.357 .190 
GINI coefficients 2008 -.005 .018 19.785 -.276 .785 
HDI 2008 .074 .020 20.395 3.730 .001 
Model fit 
     
Chi square 36013.73 
    
AIC 36037.73 
    
            Note: entries are standardized coefficients; Maximum likelihood estimates. 
 
As others have noted already (Duch & Taylor, 1993), fast economic growth can cause great socio-
economic turmoil and even prevailing economic insecurity. Furthermore, the observed cohort differences at 
least question if not disqualify the supposed role of the sense of security that the communist regime offered 
(Abramson & Inglehart, 1992). If this were so, the more postmaterialist oriented would in fact be those who 
lived under the communist regimes (i.e. older respondents) and the intergenerational differences reversed 
or absent. However, the young are indeed more postmaterialist, but the model’s interpretation of that fact is 
debatable.  
Some other data shown in Table 3 additionally question Inglehart’s assumptions. Education has 
proven to be a significant predictor of postmaterialism, as found elsewhere (Duch & Taylor, 1993; 1994; 
Pavlovic, 2009; Warwick, 1998). In Inglehart’s theory, educational level is nothing but an indirect measure 
of one’s economic welfare in formative years (Abramson & Inglehart, 1992; Inglehart, 1971; 1990; 
Inglehart&Abramson, 1994; Inglehart&Welzel, 2005). However, bearing in mind that educational level can 
“equal” a large number of different factors (formal or non-formal indoctrination, current socio-economic 
status of respondents or social background, the degree of acquisition of different skills, knowledge, values 
etc.) treating it only as an indirect measure of family welfare seems an unjustified simplification. It seems 
more appropriate to treat these pieces of evidence as an indirect manifestation of the prodemocratic 
                                                          
5 The youngest respondents are 18 years old; those who participated in the 2008/2010 EVS study were born in 1990. 
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character of postmaterialism (Duch & Taylor, 1993; 1994; Pavlovic, 2009; 2014b). The important role of 
population size of settlement can be understood in a similar vein. There is no reason to assume that the 
respondents from rural areas spend their formative years in higher physical-economic insecurity than their 
peers from urban areas. However, growing urbanization can influence the preference of postmaterialist 
goals, because the respondents from urban areas will come across confronted ideas, customs and 
attitudes earlier and be sooner socialized for the democratic norms of tolerance and the protection of 
freedom of speech (Duch & Taylor, 1993; 1994; Pavlovic, 2009; 2014b). That has nothing to do with 
Inglehart’s scarcity or socialization hypotheses. 
Finally, insignificant influence of income level or, more importantly, economic welfare in 
adolescence as well as the significance of some country level variables further questions the model’s 
assumptions. Similar to what others have reported (Clarke & Dutt, 1991; Clarke et. al., 1997; Clarke et. al., 
1999; Duch & Taylor, 1993; 1994), the preference of items in the battery is under a strong influence of 
economic context in the time period when the questions were asked. The differences in country’s inflation 
rate as well as the Human development index values at the time of the survey can account for the between-
country variance in postmaterialism. If postmaterialist values are the consequence of early socialization, 
then the contemporary economic conditions should not exert a significant influence on the postmaterialist 
preference. On the other hand, there is no evidence that economic conditions during the formative period 
have a prominent role in postmaterialist value preference. 
 
 
4. Conclusion 
Based on the presented data we can draw some more general conclusions and highlight some of their 
important implications.  
The significant influence of country’s inflation rate as well as the level of socio-economic 
development at the time of survey on variation in postmaterialist values heavily calls into question the 
proposition of (post)materialist values as early instilled, unchangeable value preferences (at least in 
Eastern Europe). The age differences are present (as the model predicts) but their interpretation should be 
more balanced and careful or even revised. Bearing in mind the dramatic changes after the fall of 
communism, the interpretation of intergenerational differences in terms of the long-term socio-economic 
development resultant seems quite improbable (at least in some East European countries). As found 
elsewhere (Clarke et al., 1999; Dutch & Taylor, 1993), postmaterialist index scores are under the relatively 
strong influence of the current, prevailing economic context. These influences are often described as period 
effects (Inglehart, 1990), a small temporary deviation from the relatively stable and previously determined 
level of postmaterialism, but it seems that these short-term variations are all there is, especially if we have 
in mind the irrelevance of the formative economic security. This interaction between the postmaterialist 
battery content and one’s economic preoccupations and concerns is strongly evidenced in the work of 
Clarke and associates (1999). They have shown that if the item “fighting rising prices” in the standard 
battery is replaced with “fighting unemployment” the percentage of materialists highly increases; the 
unemployment was rather bigger economic issues at those times than inflation and it strongly influenced 
respondents’ items selection6 . The data shown here are in line with that. The postmaterialist battery 
included the “fighting rising prices” item and the citizens of the countries with a higher inflation rate (i.e. 
economic issues regarding rising prices) chose it more often. This further implies that even one’s 
                                                          
6 A very important possible implication of this is that postmaterialism in different countries should be measured with different 
items, according to country’s prevailing economic issues. 
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materialistic concerns could be expressed by the selection of postmaterialist item(s) because there is no 
adequate materialist goal (Clarke et al., 1999). The person worried about rising unemployment and facing a 
standard four-item battery might choose “giving people more say in important government decisions” to 
express preferences for accountable policy regarding the economic/materialist issue in question. In that 
sense, the enlargement of the mixed type speaks clearly of what the East Europeans see as main 
problems in this part of Europe – further economic development as well as the further development of 
democracy. All these pieces of evidence undermine the validity of socialization hypothesis. On the other 
hand, the lack of relevance of income level and economic (in)security during adolescence directly questions 
the scarcity hypothesis. The level of current or formative affluence seems irrelevant to postmaterialist 
preference. Alternative conceptualization of postmaterialism would better fit the observed data.  
Numerous scholars have already proposed a view of postmaterialist values as a measure of the 
pro-democratic political outlook, sensitive to the prevailing and more recent experiences. Finding the strong 
influence of education and the lack of relevance of several indices of formative affluence, De Graf and 
Evans (1996) argued that standard postmaterialist index does not measure postmaterialism, but values 
related to political liberalism. Similarly, Warwick (1998) treated it as a measure of political values, showing 
that the educational level has greater impact on postmaterialist scores based on a standard four-item 
battery, than on the postmaterialist index constructed of other items without political connotation. Even the 
age or cohort differences can be explained in terms of rising educational level among youth. In some 
studies, once the education is controlled for, the cohort differences become smaller, even trivial (Duch & 
Taylor, 1993; Warwick, 1998). This viewpoint does not argue that educational institutions encourage the 
development of postmaterialism, but that some items in the battery will be rather accepted by those who, 
during their years of schooling, learned to appreciate the values they stand for. The important role of 
education and urbanization found in this study additionally supports this view. 
Finally, there are some other issues that are often overlooked. The postmaterialist value thesis, 
rooted in the Maslowian conception of human motivation, equals human values with the main ungratified 
needs. Postmaterialist goals are placed in the higher order need area, being important and pursued only 
when and if lower order needs (materialist goals) are fulfilled. However, if values are indeed equivalent to 
needs, “then the lowly rat, to the extent that it can be said to possess needs, should to the same extent also 
be said to possess values” (Rokeach, 1973, p. 20). Low ranking of some goal does not necessarily mean 
that the goal is already accomplished and taken for granted. A person can highly value something because 
he/she wants something that does not already “posses”, as well as because he/she already has it, but 
wants it more. Similarly, something can be ranked low because of the inability/immaturity to appreciate it, 
because it is already achieved and taken for granted as well as because something is neither accomplished 
nor wanted (Rokeach, 1973).  
This bears special relevance if we have in mind that respondents are essentially asked to rank 
societal, not their own personal/individual goals and that these two are not in any way analogous. Bottom 
line, Abraham Maslow talked about individual psychology and the paths in individual self-actualization, not 
describing the roads to national self-actualization (Marsh, 1975). Unconditionally and uncritically applying 
his theory of human motivation to the society as a whole would be a sort of “psychologizing”. The two are 
only partly overlapped. It is quite possible and probable to have higher order needs in private sphere and 
lower order needs in public sphere and vice versa. If one is asked to evaluate the important aims that 
society should pursue in years to come, it seems sound to do so bearing in mind the prevailing issues and 
current socio/economic/political context as well as not just his/her own (un)gratified needs but the needs of 
his/her compatriots. Societies change, their main obstacles on the road to further development change, and 
so do their evaluations as well as bases for those evaluations. The idea that these evaluations are 
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somehow “frozen in time” and rooted in the (individual and societal) past deserves at least an alternative 
reconsideration. Instead of the retrospective and egocentric rationale implicit in the standard 
(post)materialist model, prospective7 and socio-centric nature of citizens’ evaluation should be taken into 
account and made more prominent.  
In other words, instead of exclusively treating postmaterialism as a “thick” culture variable, which is 
essential, fundamental, coherent, durable (Mishler & Pollack, 2003), a “thin” view of postmaterialism, as 
rationally based, reciprocally related to political institutions, dynamic etc., deserves additional consideration. 
There is ample evidence of the relevance of political and economic evaluations for numerous political 
attitudes, beliefs and values in East European countries (e.g. Boda & Medve-Balint, 2014; Loewenberg, 
Mishler and Sanborn, 2010; Pavlovic, 2013; 2014a; Rose et al., 1997; Whitefield & Evans, 1999) and their 
explanation in rational choice terms. A research studies focused on modelling the (post)materialist value 
preferences in different societies and political regimes (Voinea, 2014; see also Voinea, 2013) has shown 
that macro-political conditions have a significant influence on individual value preferences, a sort of 
downward causation/macro-to-micro phenomena, which further influence one’s  attitudes and behaviours 
towards the macro setting. Taken together, these findings imply that effective democracy might “cause” 
postmaterialism – positive evaluations of democracy’s performances would influence more support for its 
norms and values (i.e. the postmaterialist items), which would in turn further strengthen country’s 
democracy and so on.  
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